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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5593

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INCUSNAVEUR

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 6023

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: DPC MEETING NOVEMBER 4: SACEUR'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
REPORT

REF: A. STATE 259121 DTG 010100Z NOV 75 (NOTAL)

B. USNATO 5895 DTG 291845Z OCT 75 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: DURING NOVEMBER 4 DPC CONSIDERATION OF SACEUR'S COMBAT
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT (CER), GENERAL HAIG DELIVERED VIRTUALLY
WITHOUT NOTES, A CANDID HART-HITTING, AND STRIKINGLY EFFECTIVE
80- MINUTE PRESENTATION TO PERMREPS ON TRENDS HE SEES DEVELOPING
IN RELATIVE POWER BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AS A RESULT OF
HIS NET ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC, THEATER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL
BALANCES, AND ON HIS ANALYSIS OF KEY PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES FOR
EACH REGION OF ACE. HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS NET ASSESSMENT FOLLOW:

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- STRATEGIC BALANCE: NATO AND WP HAVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALANCE,
BUT SITUATION IS HIGHLY DYNAMIC. A FAILURE OF SALT WOULD
NECESSITATE DRAMATIC EXPENDITURES TO MAINTAIN BALANCE.

- THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE: ALLIANCE IS IN HEALTHY CONDITION; BUT AGAIN SITUATION IS HIGHLY DYNAMIC. AS IT CONSIDERS MODERNIZATION OF ITS OWN TNF POSTURE, NATO MUST KEEP IN MIND WARSAW PACT IMPROVEMENTS.

- CONVENTIONAL BALANCE: SOVIETS ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY "THICKENING UP" THEIR GROUND COMBAT CAPABILITY AND STRENGTHENING THEIR BATTLE SUPPORT STRUCTURE. CHARACTER OF MODERNIZED SOVIET NAVAL FORCE REFLECTS SOVIET NAVY'S SELF IMAGE OF BEING ABLE TO PROJECT POWER IN GLOBAL SENSE. IN THE AIR, SOVIETS HAVE REVERSED THE CHARACTER OF THEIR PREVIOUSLY DEFENSIVE FORCES TO AN OFFENSIVE STRIKE ROLE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEEP WITHIN ALLIED TERRITORY.

HIGHLIGHTS OF REGIONAL ANALYSIS FOLLOW:

- NORTHERN REGION: KEY PROBLEM IS SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER, WITH REINFORCEMENT PICTURE WORSENING, PRIMARILY DUE TO UK DEFENSE REVIEW DECISIONS.

- CENTER REGION: PICTURE MORE MIXED AND FAR MORE PROMISING, BOTH AIR CREATION OF AAFCE) AND GROUND (FRG RESTRUCTURING). GREATEST CONSTRAINT IS MALPOSITIONING, BOTH TACTICAL (MALDEPLOYMENT) AND STRATEGIC (LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY AND RATIONALIZED LOGISTICS), PARTICULARLY IN NORTHAG. GENERAL HAIG PRAISED FRG APPROACH TO TOOTH-TO-TAIL IMPROVEMENTS THAT, UNLIKE OTHERS, PLANS RATIONALLY FOR SUFFICIENT SUPPORT DURING PERIODS OF MOBILIZATION OF IMPROVED COMBAT FORCES.

- SOUTHERN REGION: AREA TRADITIONALLY LESS THAN SATISFACTORY IN WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITY. SHORTAGES IN WAR RESERVES AND COMMUNICATIONS ,
COMMAND AND CONTROL, WITHDRAWAL OF UK NAVAL FORCES AND ITALIAN FORCE RESTRUCTURING ARE KEY AREAS OF CONCERN. REGARDING LATTER, GENERAL HAIG NOTED THAT SHAPE ANALYSIS OF RESTRUCTURINGS INDICATES LAG BETWEEN STATED GOALS OF FORCE MODERNIZATION
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EXPRESSED DURING RESTRUCTURING AND ACTUAL FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO MAKE MODERNIZATION POSSIBLE.

SUMMARIZING, GENERAL HAIG DECLARED THAT MANY IMPROVEMENTS ARE WITHIN PRESENT ALLIANCE RESOURCES. HE NOTED SACEUR FLEXIBILITY STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS, COMMENTING THAT THEY FOCUS INITIALLY ON CENTER REGION WHERE, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO REINFORCEMENT, RATIONALIZATION MUST OCCUR FIRST TO PROVIDE DEFINITIVE CALCULUS TO RESOLVE DEFICIENCIES ON THE FLANKS. HE ATTACHED TOP PRIORITY TO IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, IMPROVEMENTS TO REINFORCEMENT PLANS (INCLUDING USE OF CIVIL RESOURCES), CONTINUATION OF EXERCISE SERIES CONCEPT AND WORK ON A BROAD RANGE OF LOGISTICS SHORTCOMINGS. PERMREPS' QUESTIONS CENTERED AROUND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES. AT

AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE' SUGGESTION, SYG, CMC AND SACEUR WILL WORK OUT
THE
PROCEDURE WHEREBY DPC CAN OBTAIN SACEUR'S PERSONAL VIEWS
DIRECTLY, AS ON THIS OCCASION, MORE OFTEN THAN ONCE PER YEAR.
END SUMMARY.

1. DURING NOVEMBER 4 DPC CONSIDERATION OF SACEUR'S COMBAT
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, SYG LUNS OPENED MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE
REPORT DEALS WITH ONLY THOSE FORCES ASSIGNED AND EARMARKED TO
SACEUR'S COMMAND. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FORWARDS THE
REPORTS, IT IS VERY MUCH A MATTER OF PERSONAL OPINION AND THE
JUDGMENT OF GENERAL HAIG. LUNS THEN WELCOMED GENERAL HAIG AND,
NOTING THAT HIS COMMENTS IN THE REPORT RELATE TO THE SITUATION OF
FORCES IN 1974, ASKED PERMREPS TO FOCUS THEIR DISCUSSION ON
ACTIVITY WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE THIS YEAR AND ON WHAT FURTHER NEEDS
TO BE DONE. IN THIS REGARD, HE NOTED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
SACEUR'S FLEXIBILITY STUDY, WHICH HAD BEEN CIRCULATED EARLIER IN
THE WEEK. LUNS WENT ON TO SAY THAT MOST DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT ARE QUALITATIVE, BUT THAT HE WAS STRUCK
PARTICULARLY BY SACEUR'S PARAGRAPH 4 STATEMENT THAT SINCE 1970 THE
EQUIVALENT OF 10 DIVISIONS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE NATO ORDER OF
BATTLE. HE CALLED THIS TREND "DISTURBING", PARTICULARLY SINCE THE
ALLIANCE IS DISCUSSING RESTRUCTURINGS AND PLANNED REDUCTIONS IN
PERSONNEL STRENGTH WITHIN SEVERAL COUNTRIES.

2. ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN, MC) SAID THAT MC HAS STUDIED
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SACEUR'S CER WITH GREAT CARE. HE DESCRIBED IT AS ONE OF THE MOST
VALUABLE DOCUMENTS TO COME BEFORE THE MC, AND NOTED SIMILARITY
OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THOSE OF FLEXIBILITY STUDY. HE STATED
THAT THE FORCES ASSIGNED AND EARMARKED TO NATO ARE THE ONES FOR
WHICH THE ALLIES ARE SPENDING THEIR DOLLARS; HE AGREED WITH SACEUR
THAT THE ALLIANCE IS NOT GETTING FULL VALUE FOR THESE DOLLARS.

3. GENERAL HAIG (SACEUR) THEN BEGAN A LENGTHY PRESENTATION BY
NOTING THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST SUBSTANTIVE APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
DPC. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE, AS HE COMPLETES HIS
FIRST YEAR AS SACEUR, TO STATE HIS VIEWS ON PRESENT TRENDS AND HIS
PRESENT ASSESSMENT OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES. THEREFORE, HE WOULD
NOT BELABOR THE CONTENTS OF THE 1974 REPORT. HE PROPOSED TO
DIVIDE HIS REMARKS INTO THREE SECTIONS: THOSE DEALING WITH THE
REPORT ITSELF; THE TRENDS HE SEES IN RELATIVE POWER IN THE TRIAD
OF STRATEGIC, THEATER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES; AND
HIS ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE TO CARRY
OUT ITS WARTIME TASKS.

4. REGARDING THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT ITSELF, 1974 HAD
BEEN A YEAR OF MIXED PROGRESS. ON THE PLUS SIDE, THERE WERE
ADDITIONAL TANKS, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, HELICOPTERS, AIRCRAFT,
SHELTERS AND IMPROVEMENTS TO AIR DEFENSE. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, HE

NOTED MANPOWER SHORTFALLS, WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE SITUATION "MAY GET WORSE". HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL NATIONS FAILED TO MEET THE 18-MONTH TERM OF SERVICE STANDARD FOR CONSCRIPTS. HE REMARKED ON SCARCITY OF RESERVISTS AND CONSTRAINTS AGAINST MOVING CANADIAN, UK AND US REINFORCEMENTS TO AND WITHIN THEATER. HE NOTED SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL, A BASIC NEED THAT HAD BEEN LARGELY OVERLOOKED. REGARDING LOGISTICS SHORTCOMINGS, HE TERMED ALLIED PERFORMANCE "SPOTTY": IN THE NORTH WAR STOCKS ARE AT LESS THAN DESIRABLE LEVEL; IN THE CENTER THEY ARE APPROACHING SATISFACTORY STATUS; IN THE SOUTH THEY ARE TOALLY UNSATISFACTORY. HE NOTED THAT THE ALLIANCE STILL LACKED ADEQUATE ARMOR AND ANTI-ARMOR, ESPECIALLY IN FLANK REGIONS. HE STATED THAT IN 1974 ALLIED AIR FORCES HAD BEEN GROWING OBSOLESCEMENT, BUT THAT 1975 HAD GIVEN CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM. HE NOTED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT MADE STEADY PROGRESS ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN POTENTIALLY "DREADFUL CONSEQUENCES" IN WARTIME. FINALLY, HE NOTED THE PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION: THE WITHDRAWAL OF 6 -3 DIVISION EQUIVALENTS OF GREEK FORCES FROM THE
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INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND THE GAPS IN COMMAND, CONTROL AND COOPERATION.

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5. GENERAL HAIG THEN TURNED TO THE TRENDS HE SEES IN RELATIVE POWER BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

A. REGARDING STRATEGIC FORCES, HE SAID THAT SINCE 1962 THE SOVIET UNION HAS ELIMINATED A 10:1 INFERIORITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. HE ASSESSED THE PRESENT BALANCE AS "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE", THE FUTURE OF WHICH WILL BE DRIVEN BY THE OUTCOME OF SALT. HOWEVER, WITH OR WITHOUT SALT, HE CALLED PERMREPS' ATTENTION TO THE ALARMING DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS: FOUR NEW ICBM SYSTEMS, THREE OF WHICH HAD BEEN TESTED WITH MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY WARHEADS, AND ALL OF WHICH DEMONSTRATED IMPROVED ACCURACY; DEVELOPMENT OF THE SS-N-8 MISSILE AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE DELTA CALSS SUBMARINE. HE NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT FROM ITS STATION IN THE BARENTS SEA, THE DELTA CAN TARGET THE PANAMA CANAL, COMMUNIST CHINA AND ANY LOCATION WITHIN THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE, ADDING THAT DELTA DEPLOYMENT INCREASES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
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NORTHERN REGION. FINALLY, HE STATED THAT IF SALT FAILS, NATO WILL FACE DRAMATIC EXPENDITURE INCREASES FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

B. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. GENERAL HAIG SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS TRADITIONALLY TAKEN COMFORT IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE. AGAIN, THIS SITUATION IS HIGHLY DYNAMIC. HE NOTED THE INCREASE IN FROG AND SCUD SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE 152 MM SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY WITH SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SS-X-N-20, AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE, WHICH WILL HAVE A MULTIPLE WARHEAD AND BE MOBILE. IN THIS REGARD, HE ALSO NOTED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A "FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET TACTICAL AIR THREAT." HE SAID THAT SOVIET AIRCRAFT HAVE IN RECENT YEARS INCREASED THEIR LOAD-CARRYING CAPABILITY BY 2.5 TIMES AND THEIR RANGE BY 3 TIMES. HE DESCRIBED SOVIET AIR FORCES, WHICH PREVIOUSLY SEEMED TO BE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE IN CHARACTER, AS NOW ORIENTED TOWARD DEEP-THRUST TACTICS, CARRYING EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. SUMMING UP, HE SAID THAT NET ASSESSMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN A HEALTHY CONDITION REGARDING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT A HIGHLY DYNAMIC ONE. HE SUGGESTED THAT AS THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERS MODERNIZING ITS OWN TNF POSTURE, WE NOT LOSE SIGHT OF IMPROVEMENTS BEING MADE ON THE OTHER SIDE.

C. CONVENTIONAL FORCES. GENERAL HAIG STATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS SIMULTANEOUSLY "THICKENING UP" ITS COMBAT CAPABILITY AND STRENGTHENING ITS BATTLE SUPPORT STRUCTURE. IN PARTICULAR, HE NOTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY AND A 50 PER CENT INCREASE IN THE WARSAW PACT'S CAPABILITY TO TRANSPORT AMMUNITION AND POL. HE THEN DEALT AT SOME LENGTH WITH WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN "EXPULSION" IN SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITY. NUJBERS ASIDE, THE CHARACTER OF THIS "EXPLOSION" INDICATES AN ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER IN A GLOBAL SENSE. HE NOTED

SOVIET ASW CARRIERS OPERATING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THREE AIR-CRAFT CARRIERS IN VARIOUS STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FITTING OUT. HE FURTHER NOTED THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FLEET. HE SUMMED UP THE TREND IN SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITIES AS "ALARMING" FOR THE ALLIANCE. REGARDING TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITIES, HE REPEATED HIS ASSESSMENT THAT THE CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET THREAT HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED.

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6. GENERAL HAIG THEN PROCEEDED TO ASSESSMENTS BY REGION OF NATO CAPABILITIES AND DEFICIENCIES. HE STATED AT THE OUTSET THAT HE WOULD BE FRANK.

A. NORTHERN REGION. THE PROBLEM IS FUNDAMENTALLY ONE OF SHORTFALLS IN MANPOWER. FOR ANY MOBILIZATION SCENARIO, THE WARSAW PACT HAS THE DISTINCT FORCE ADVANTAGE. THEREFORE, NORTHERN FLANK COUNTRIES DEPEND HEAVILY ON REINFORCEMENTS. DESPITE THIS, THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN UK REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY; US MARINE CORPS REINFORCEMENTS ARE CONSTRAINED IN TIME OF ARRIVAL TO 120 DAYS FOLLOWING MOBILIZATION; THE UK AND DUTCH MARINE BATTALIONS ARE "HEADING IN THE OTHER DIRECTION"; ONLY THE CANADIAN AIR-SEA TRANSPORTABLE COMBAT GROUP IS A SOLID BET, AND THAT IS CONSTRAINED BY LACK OF LIFE. IN ADDITION, RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS IN NORWAY ARE "POOR" AND THERE IS A SEVERE LACK OF PRE-STOCKAGE. GENERAL HAIG STATED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO RATIONALIZE REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES FOR THE NORTHERN REGION UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED RATIONALIZATION OF THE SAME CAPABILITIES IN THE CENTER REGION. OTHER NORTHERN REGION DEFICIENCIES HE NOTED WERE: SHORT CONSCRIPT TIMES, LACK OF AUTOMATED AIR DEFENSE AND FUNDAMENTAL SHORTFALLS IN COMMUNICATIONS.

B. CENTER REGION. GENERAL HAIG STATED THAT THE CENTRAL FRONT IS THE SINE QUA NON OF THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, SINCE IT GUARDS THE GATEWAY TO ITS HEART. HE DESCRIBED THE PICTURE HERE AS "MORE MIXED AND FAR MORE PROMISING". REGARDING TACTICAL AIR, HE SAID THAT SINCE THE ADOPTION OF AAFCE, THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN 2 ATAF AND 4 ATAF HAS DISAPPEARED. EXERCISE OF THE AAFCE CONCEPT IN GROSSE ROCHADE AND REFORGER HAS DEMONSTRATED IMPROVEMENT THAT IS NOTHING SHORT OF REVOLUTIONARY. HE NOTED THAT STANDARDIZATION OF DOCTRINE AND TACTICS HAD MADE GREAT STEPS FORWARD AND THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATIC WAR HEADQUARTERS AT BOERFINK WILL RESULT IN EXPONENTIAL GAINS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ACE TACTICAL FORCES. HE ALSO NOTED THE BENEFITS OF THE NEW UK AIR COMMAND TO THE CENTER REGION. REGARDING GROUND FORCES, HE SAID THAT FUNDAMENTAL DEFICIENCIES REMAIN, BUT THAT NO OBJECTIVE OBSERVER COULD FAIL TO NOTE THE BENEFITS OF FRG RESTRUCTURING ON ITS CAPABILITY IN THE CENTER REGION AND THE FACT THAT ITS COMBAT FORCES ARE BACKED BY HIGHLY COMPETENT TERRITORIAL FORCE STRUCTURE. HE NOTED THAT THESE TERRITORIAL FORCES PROVIDE EXCELLENT SUPPORT TO THE COMBAT FORCES AND SAID

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THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THE TOOTH-TO-TAIL IMPROVEMENTS BEING PURSUED BY OTHER NATIONS PROMISED EQUAL SUCCESS. GENERAL HAIG THEN NOTED TH CONSTRAINTS ON CENTER REGION DEFENSE. HE SAID THAT CORRECTION OF TACTICAL MALPOSITIONING (OVER 50 PERCENT OF COMBAT FORCES ARE MORE THAN 100 KILOMETERS FROM THEIR COMBAT POSITIONS) WOULD BE COSTLY. HE AGREED WITH THE ALLIANCE'S 1971 CONCLUSION TO AVOID INVESTING GREAT AMOUNTS OF MONEY IN CORRECTING TACTICAL MALDEPLOYMENTS; THIS MONEY COULD BETTER BE INVESTED IN WEAPONS AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS. IN CONTRAST TO THIS WAS WHAT GENERAL HAIG DESCRIBED AS "STRATEGIC MALPOSITIONING" IN NORTHAG. HE NOTED THAT EACH OF THE FOUR CORPS DEPLOYED THERE HAS SEPARATE LOGISTIC TRAINS AND LACKS INTEROPERABILITY WITH THE OTHERS. FURTHERMORE: THE NETHERLANDS MAINTAINS ONLY ONE BRIGADE FORWARD OUT OF ITS 3 DIVISION COMMITMENT; THE BRITISH CORPS IN 14 PERCENT SHORT OF ITS WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH (IN THIS REGARD, GENERAL HAIG EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE BRITISH ARMY'S REORGANIZATION WOULD NOT PROVIDE A FORMULA FOR FURTHER REDUCTION); IN THE BELGIAN CORPS AREA SOME BRIGADES ARE BEING PULLED BACK AND BELGIAN CONSCRIPT TERM OF SERVICE IS BEING REDUCED. IN GENERAL, NORTHAG SEVERELY LACKS EARMARKED RESERVES. REGARDING CENTAG, GENERAL HAIG DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS "BETTER". HE NOTED THAT ONLY TWO NATIONS PROVIDE FORWARD FORCES, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP (THE CENTAG RESERVE) COULD LOOK FORWARD TO "LONG OVERDUE MODERNIZATION". HE SAID THAT SINCE HIS ARRIVAL THE US HAS REVISED ITS STRATEGIC CONCEPT TO FIT THE FORWARD STATIONING CONCEPT OF THE FRG, DESCRIBING THE LATTER AS DICTATED BY POLITICAL IMPERATIVES. HE STATED THAT THIS STRATEGY MIGHT BE RISKY BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF RESERVES, BUT NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK NOT TO TAKE NOTE OF THE TWO FRENCH DIVISIONS IN GERMANY AND THREE OTHER DIVISIONS IN RESERVE IN FRANCE. HIS CHIEF CONCLUSION ON THE CENTER REGION WAS THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS WORK TO DO IN NORTHAG. HE NOTED THAT ONE OF THE TWO NEW US BRIGADES WOULD BE STATIONED THERE AS THE NUCLEUS OF A WARTIME CORPS. HE STATED THAT HE DISAGREED WITH THOSE WHO FELT THAT NORTHAG AREA WOULD BE A BOWLING ALLEY FOR A WARSAW PACT ADVANCE, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NORTHERN ATTACK WOULD PROVIDE "THE SHORTEST SLIDE FOR THE GREATEST GAIN", AND BE AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION FOR WARSAW PACT PLANNERS.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5595
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C. SOUTHERN FLANK. GENERAL HAIG DESCRIBED IT AS A "POLITICAL SHAMBLES". HE NOTED THAT THE SOUTHERN FLANK HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN LESS THAN SATISFACTORY IN WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY; ITS WAR RESERVE STOCKS POSTURE IS POOR AND ITS COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS LAG BADLY. HE ALSO NOTED SHORTAGES AND ADVANCED AGE OF ITALIAN, GREEK AND TURKISH ARMOR. HE STATED THAT SHAPE HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY UK WITHDRAWAL FROM MEDITERRANEAN OF ITS NAVAL FORCES BUT OBSERVED THAT THE LARGEST NAVAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IS THAT OF FRANCE. TURNING TO THE ITALIAN FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW, HE WELCOMED POSSIBLE COMBAT CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENTS BUT NOTED POSSIBILITY OF LOSING ONE-TIRD OF ITALIAN COMBAT BRIGADES. HE ADDED THAT SHAPE'S INITIAL ANALYSIS OF RESTRUCTURINGS SUGGESTS A LAG BETWEEN THE STATED GOALS OF MODERNIZATION (WHICH FORM A PART OF RESTRUCTURING DECISIONS) AND THE ACUTAL COMMITMENT OF FUNDS TO MAKE SUCH MODERNIZATION POSSIBLE.

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7. IN SUMMING UP HIS PRESENTATION, GENERAL HAIG NOTED THAT MOST NEEDED MEASURES ARE WITHIN THE RESOURCES CAPABILITIES OF ALIED NATIONS. HE REMARKED THAT HE HAD JUST SENT HIS FLEXIBILITY STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS TO NATO HEADQUARTERS, OUTLINING 236 ITEMS, OF WHICH 152 ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY. HE TOLD THE DPC THAT WE NEED FIRST TO COMPLET THESE 152 ITEMS, AND THAT OF THE REMAINING 84 ALL BUT 31 ARE LOW OR NO COST. HE ALSO STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT

FLEXIBILITY STUDY FOCUSES ON THE CENTER REGON, SIMILAR ANALYSES ARE BEING PREPARED FOR THE FLANKS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIANCE GIVE THE CENTER REGION PRIORITY ATTENTION NOW SINCE THE PRINCIPAL BARRIER TO IMPROVEMENTS ON THE NORTHER AND SOUTHERN FLANKS IS OUR PRESENT INABILITY TO RATIONALIZE CENTER REGION DEFENSES. GENERAL HAIG TEN STATED HIS TOP PRIORITIES AS FOLLOWS:

A. IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL.

B. IMPROVEMENTS IN PLANS FOR REINFORCEMENT GROUND FORCES INCLUDING MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL RESOURCES. HE NOTED THAT THIS IS A NO-COST PLANNING EXERCISE.

C. CONTINUATION OF THE CONCEPT OF EXERCISE SERIES UNDER A SHAPE UMBRELLA, WITH MORE ACTIVE EXERCISE OF HIGHER LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS.

D. WORK ON A BROAD RANGE OF LOGISTICS SHORTCOMINGS INCLUDING STANDARDIZATION, POSITIONING OF STOCKS AND INCREASES IN WAR RESERVES.

HE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE ITEMS IN HIS FLEXIBILITY REPORT, INCLUDING THOSE TO WHICH HE GIVES TOP PRIORITY, ARE ACHIEVABLE WITHIN ALLIED RESOURCES.

8. SYG LUNS THANKED GEN GAIG FOR A PRESENTATION HE DESCRIBED AS "IMPRESSIVE, ELOQUENT, DETAILED AND TO THE POINT." AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) ECHOED SYG LUNS' COMMENT THAT PRESENTATION HAD BEEN "IMPRESSIVE". HE ASKED WHETHER THE ALLIANCE COULD FIND MEANS OF REPEATING THIS FORM OF CONTACT. HE SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED GEN GAIG'S ANALYSIS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME SPECIFICS HE WOULD DISAGREE WITH: IN BELGIUM, REDUCTION IN CONSCRIPT
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PTIME HAD BEEN REPLACED BY A SYSTEM OF VOLUNTEERS SERVING TWO TO SEVEN YEARS. HE CONTINUED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO PURSUE THE MATTER TODAY, BUT DESCRIBED A NEED FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND SACEUR AT THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL. DE STAERCKE THEN OUTLINED A PROPOSAL FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE: HE RECALLED THAT BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD CO-LOCATED WITH NATO HEADQUARTERS, THE COUNCIL HAD HAD SACEURS FROM GEN EISENHOWER TO GEN NORSTAD BRIEF IT SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR ON THEIR CONCERNS AND HOPES. HE NOTED THAT MC DOES HAVE A CERTAIN AUTHORITY IN THIS MATTER, BUT SUGGESTED THAT DPC ARRANGE TO BRING SACEUR TO MEETINGS 3 TO 4 TIMES PER YEAR. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS "RENEWING A LOST TRADITION". DE STAERCKE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY SACEUR'S STATEMENT, IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF HIS COVERING LETTER TO THE CER, THAT THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF COUNCIL ATTENTION TO SACEUR'S MILITARY PROBLEMS MUST BE POLITICAL IN NATURE. HE NOTED THAT MANY PROBLEMS ARE POLITICO-MILITARY IN NATURE, AND STATED THAT HIS PROPOSAL FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH SACEUR TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS "UNDER THE AEIGIS OF THE MC" WOULD BE MOST FRUITFUL. SYG LUNS, WHO HAD BEEN CONFERRING WITH ADM HILL-NORTON DURING DE STAERCKE'S INTERVENTION, STATED THAT ADM HILL-NORTON ACCEPTED THE SUGGESTION OF MORE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE DPC AND SACEUR. HE FURTHER STATED THAT ADM HILL-NORTON WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH GEN HAIG AND DE STAERCKE, AND DECLARED HIMSELF IN FAVOR OF THE IDEA.

9 AMBASSADOR MEZIES(CANADA) COMPLIMENTED GEN HAIG ON HIS ELOQUENCE IN MAKING A LONG REPORT A LIVELY ONE. HE ASKED SACEUR WHETHER HE SAW NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LAND FORCES ARISING FROM LESSONS OF THE AUTUMN FORGE SERIES OF EXERCISES. GEN HAIG RESPONDED BY STATING THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE 1975 AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISE SERIES MEERLY INVOLVED A BLANKET SCENARIO FOR A NUMBER OF NATIONAL EXERCISES, AND THAT HIGHER LEVEL NATO COMMANDERS DID NOT EXERCISE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS OR COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING THAT SERIES. HE SAID THAT IN THE AREA OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS " APPALLING LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY EXISTS, AS COMPARED TO THEATER COMMUNICATIONS WHICH NEED ONLY FOLLOW-THROUGH ON PRESENTLY APPROVED ALLIANCE PROJECTS. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) THANKED

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GEN HAIG FOR HIS FRANK EXPOSE OF ALLIANCE PROBLEMS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT NATIONS MUST CONFRONT GEN HAIG'S REALISM WITH OTHER REALITIES INVOLVING THE POLITICAL SITUATIONS WITHIN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. REGARDING THE ITALIAN FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW, HE NOTED THAT AT FIRST GLANCE THE PICTURE MIGHT APPEAR GLOOMY, BUT ITALY NEEDS TO ADAPT ITS MILITARY TO ITS POLITICAL SITUATION. KEEPING IN MIND THE PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION WITHIN ITALY, THE GOVERNMENT MUST GO AT A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE PACE.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 OIC-02 NSC-05 /065 W
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R 061140Z NOV 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4438
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5596
CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE

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10. US CHARGE THANKED GEN GAIG FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND STATED THAT HIS FRANKNESS HAD BEEN WELCOME. HE SAID WE WOULD BE CAREFUL TO NOTE AND REPORT AREAS WHICH GEN HAIG HAD POINTED OUT AS DEFICIENCIES ON THE PART OF THE US. HE SUPPORTED SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE CAPABILITIES ESSENTIAL TO A SUSTAINED CONVENTIONAL FORWARD DEFENSE ARE REALISTICALLY ATTAINABLE, AND WELCOMED THE POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH SACEUR HAD ADOPTED IN HIS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FURTHER THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF ACE FORCES WITHIN PRESENT RESOURCES. CHARGE CONTINUED, DRAWING ON REF A, THAT MANY OF THE DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY SACEUR COULD BE ATTENUATED BY MORE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE DPC. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR SACEUR'S EMPHASIS ON:

- A. HIGH PRIORITY FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL,
- B. NEED FOR PREPARATIONS FOR RAPID RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES,

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C. IMPORTANCE OF AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF WAR RESERVE STOCKS,

D. NEED FOR RATIONALIZATION OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT POSTURE,

E. IMPORTANCE IN FOLLOW-ON PLANNING OF SACEUR'S FLEXIBILITY STUDY AND OF THE VIEWS OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON INTEROPERABILITY. HE SAID THAT THE US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT NATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO CORRECT THESE DEFICIENCIES, AND PLEDGED US TO DO ITS PART, WHILE URGING ALLIES TO DO THE SAME. CHARGE CONTINUED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SACEUR'S REPORT, WHICH MARKS A NEW AND REALISTIC DEPARTURE IN THIS SERIES OF ASSESSMENTS, WE WOULD URGE SACEUR TO PROPOSE WAYS TO REALIZE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS BY MAKING THEM PART OF HIS FORCE PROPOSALS FOR THE NEXT FORCE PLANNING PERIOD. HE ALSO URGED THAT SACEUR CONSIDER DIRECTING APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS ON COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMS TOWARD A SYSTEM OF REGIONALLY ORIENTED REVIEWS OF THOSE PROGRAMS, NOTING THAT EWG IS ALREADY DEVELOPING SUCH A SYSTEM. FINALLY CHARGE JOINED AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE IN FAVORING MORE OCCASIONS FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET WITH SACEUR.

1. SYG LUNS QUERIED GEN HAIG ON HIS STATEMENT THAT US MARINE CORPS REINFORCEMENTS TO THE NORTHERN FLANK WOULD TAKE 120 DAYS TO ARRIVE. SACEUR CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE PLANNING FIGURE, SINCE OTHER UNITS OF HIGHER PRIORITY HAVE FIRST CLAIM

ON LIFT RESOURCES. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE DECLARED HIMSELF "STRUCK BY THIS". HE HAD THOUGHT THAT REINFROMCEMENT TIMES WERE MORE IN THE AREA OF 2 TO 3 WEEKS. GEN HAIG RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE TRADITIONALLY LOOKED AT REINFORCEMENT IN TERMS OF AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ASSETS UNDER MILITARY CONTROL. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN AMERICAN COMMANDER, HE HAD UNDERWAY A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THIS SUBJECT, AND THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO ENCOURAGE THE SAME AT HATO HEADQUARTERS. HE NOTED THAT CIVIL AIRLIFT RESOURCES COULD PERMIT GREAT IMPROVEMENTS IN REINFORCEMENT TIMES, AND STATED THAT WHAT HE IS TRYING TO DO NOW IS COMPLETE ARRANGMENTS FOR THEIR USE. HE ASSURED PERMREPS
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THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE TO REDUCE US FORCES. SYG LUNS NOTED LINK DRAWN BY GEN HAIG BETWEEN CENTER REGION AND NORTHERN REGION REINFORCEMENT FORCES. HE ASKED IF THE PROBLEM WAS DRIVEN BY MATERIAL OR MANPOWER. GEN HAIG RESPONDED THAT THAT MANPOWER WAS THE PROBLEM. HE CONTINUED THAT IF WE HAD A DEFINITIVE CALCULUS FOR THE CENTER REGION, WE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO LOOK AT REINFORCEMENT ASSETS WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED ELSEWHERE, WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD, IN FACT, BE APPLIED WLSEWHERE.

12. DUE TO PRESSURE OF TIME, SYG LUNS THEN CLOSED DIALOGUE AND TURNED TO NEXT AGENDA ITEM. COMMENT: WE SEE GREAT MERIT IN DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS BETWEEN SACEUR AND DPC. SUCH A PROCEDURE MIGHT ALSO INVOLVE PERIODIC APPEARANCES OF SACLANT FOR SIMILAR BRIEFINGS AND EXCHANGES OF VIEWS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE IDEAS WOULD STIMULATE A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE AT A LEVEL OF DETAIL WITH WHICH PERMREPS SHULD BE CONVERSANT. IF WASHINGTON AGREES, WE WILL FORMALLY SUPPORT DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION, ASKING THAT IT BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE SACLANT. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE.
STREATOR

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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INCUSNAVEUR

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